Silicon Valley Bank released its 15th annual Direct-to-Consumer Wine Report in June, drawing on responses from 450 family wineries. The headline framing from author Rob McMillan is cautiously hopeful: the steepest part of the post-2021 correction appears to be behind us, the rate of decline is slowing, and the market is showing early signs of stabilizing. His caveat is the part worth holding onto. Stabilization is not recovery. There is still no return to growing demand, and McMillan expects the industry to reach zero growth somewhere between 2027 and 2028.

For Virginia, this report is not background reading. It is a direct mirror. Across the SVB dataset, Virginia wineries derive 89 percent of sales from direct-to-consumer channels, the highest share of any region in the survey and well above the 67 percent average. We are the most DtC-dependent winegrowing state in the country. That concentration has been a strength for years. It also means that every pressure the report identifies in the DtC channel lands on Virginia with less cushion than almost anyone else has.

Here are the findings that matter most for our members, and what they suggest about where to put our energy.

The gap between winning and struggling is widening

The single most important number in the report is the spread. Top-quartile wineries in the dataset grew revenue by 22 percent last year. Bottom-quartile wineries declined by 13 percent. The median winery had no growth at all. The same headwinds are blowing on everyone, but outcomes are diverging sharply, and McMillan argues the difference is not luck or market position. It is philosophy.

High-performing wineries face outward, toward customers and relationships, and ask how to understand what their target consumer wants and then get that consumer to want what they are selling. Low-performing wineries face inward, toward operations and cost, and ask how to make what they already sell cheaper to produce. Efficiency matters, and no winery can ignore its cost structure in this market. But the report is blunt that efficiency is the price of admission, not a growth strategy. You cannot cut your way to demand.

Pricing discipline is a signal, and Virginia is already sending it

The pricing chapter is where Virginia looks comparatively healthy. The report found that successful wineries were 60 percent more likely to raise bottle prices than low performers, while struggling wineries were more than twice as likely to name discounting and price cuts as their primary strategy. Sweeping discounts across a portfolio read to luxury buyers as a signal that the bloom is off the rose, and they erode brand equity.

Virginia held the line here. Only 7 percent of Virginia respondents lowered their tasting fee in 2025, near the bottom of all regions, and Virginia sat at the very low end on cutting tasting fees specifically to chase visitation. That restraint is the behavior the report rewards. It is worth pairing with the report’s more nuanced point: discounting is not the enemy, undisciplined discounting is. The wineries finding success discount strategically. They give something up only to get something back, they discount shipping or bundle rather than cutting a single bottle’s price, and they protect the headline price while blending value in through smaller formats or a surprise bottle on a case purchase.

One more data point should encourage Virginia producers thinking about price positioning. The strongest DtC growth last year came in the $60 to $69 retail band, which saw cases sold rise 12 percent and dollars rise 15 percent. The sub-$20 tier declined on both measures. Virginia’s average suggested retail price sits at roughly $36, below that high-performing band. There is room to grow into premium positioning where the quality supports it, rather than competing on cheapness.

The tasting room is still central, but it can no longer carry the whole load

Reservation data shows a consistent decline in visitation, averaging about 2 percent year over year on a trailing twelve-month basis, with no sustained recovery yet. Low-performing wineries are 2.3 times more likely to name “tasting room changes,” meaning renovations, new layouts, or reservation systems, as their primary fix. The report’s verdict on that instinct is skeptical. The building is rarely the problem.

The tasting fee experiment tells a mixed story. Of the 15.5 percent of wineries that lowered fees, a rate that doubled year over year, only a quarter saw improved visitation. Roughly another quarter said it stabilized things, a fifth saw no improvement, and the rest were inconclusive. Lowering a fee in isolation is not a customer acquisition strategy. It works only when it is attached to a clear plan for who you are trying to reach and why.

What separates the high performers is that they treat the tasting room as an acquisition engine and a revenue generator at the same time, and crucially, they do not depend on it alone. The report’s most forward-looking signal is a growing set of wineries generating revenue away from the tasting room entirely. McMillan’s recurring line is that the industry has barely marketed to the customer where they actually live. The tactics he highlights from successful wineries read like a playbook Virginia is well positioned to run: traveling tastings and rotating club events in markets where members are concentrated, participation in regional community events, on-the-road tastings, and taking the brand to the customer rather than waiting for the visit.

For Virginia, with the Washington and Richmond corridors on our doorstep and a customer base that does not require a destination weekend to reach, this is less a pivot than a permission slip. Off-site, in-market selling is exactly the kind of second revenue stream the report says the channel needs.

Wine club: retention is now the whole game

Club performance is one of the clearest pressure points in the report. Net membership across the dataset is flat to declining, with acquisition and attrition rates running close together. The industry’s net club growth rate was 2 percent last year, down from 13 percent in 2021. New signups are largely being offset by cancellations, and longtime members with high lifetime value are aging out of the system.

Virginia’s club numbers are a relative bright spot inside a difficult category. Virginia posted a high acquisition rate of 29 percent, though attrition of 26 percent ran close behind it, and net membership change for the state came in at roughly flat against a regional average decline of 2 percent. Flat is not growth, but in this environment it beats the field. Average member tenure in Virginia sits at 34 months, in the middle of the pack.

The report’s takeaway is that the club has changed jobs. For most wineries it is no longer the primary growth engine. It is becoming a stabilizing force, and retention now matters as much as acquisition. The good news underneath the pressure is that lifetime value per club member reached a record $2,803 last year. The members who stay are worth more than ever, which raises the return on engagement, flexibility, and experience-based benefits over pure pricing incentives.

What this means for Virginia

The through-line of the report is that the DtC model is intact but under strain, and the variation in results comes down to execution rather than channel mix. For a state that runs almost entirely on this model, that is both a warning and an opportunity.

The warning is concentration risk. With 89 percent of sales tied to DtC and visitation softening across the board, Virginia has the least room to wait out the cycle. The opportunity is that the behaviors the report associates with the top quartile are largely behaviors of mindset and effort rather than capital. Holding pricing discipline, which Virginia is already doing. Reaching customers in their home markets, which our geography makes unusually practical. Treating the club as a retention and engagement asset rather than a discount funnel. Building genuine relationships with a focused set of customers instead of chasing undifferentiated traffic.

McMillan closes the report on the relationships wineries are building now with customers, teams, and communities, calling them the investments that will pay off as the model evolves. For Virginia, where the relationship with the visitor has always been the product, that is familiar ground. The task ahead is to extend that relationship beyond the cellar door and into the markets where our customers already are.

The 2026 Silicon Valley Bank Direct-to-Consumer Wine Report is authored by Rob McMillan, EVP and Founder of the SVB Wine Division. Figures cited here reflect 2025 annual data from 450 surveyed wineries. The full report is available at svb.com/wine.